Berkshire Hathaway Portfolio for Indian Investors 2026: LRS Replica, Tax, Real Cost

As of Q3 2025 13F filing, Berkshire's top 10 public equity holdings ranked by market value are Apple approximately 69 billion dollars (reduced from peak 174 billion), American Express 42 billion, Bank of America 33 billion, Coca-Cola 25 billion, Chevron 18 billion, Occidental Petroleum 14 billion, Moody's 12 billion, Kraft Heinz 11 billion, Sirius XM 7 billion, and Kroger 3 billion. The largest non-US position is the combined Japanese sogo shosha basket of Mitsubishi Corp, Mitsui, Itochu, Marubeni, and Sumitomo Corp totalling 28 billion dollars. Berkshire also holds 325 billion dollars in cash and US Treasury bills as of Q3 2025, the largest cash pile in the company's history, generating roughly 16.5 billion dollars annually in interest income at current T-bill yields of 5.1 percent. The portfolio composition has shifted meaningfully under Greg Abel who became CEO in January 2026.

Indian investors access Berkshire through three routes. First, direct LRS purchase via INDmoney, Vested, Groww US, or HDFC SkyTrader. BRK.B trades at roughly 450 dollars per share, equivalent to 38,000 rupees at 84.5 rupees per USD. Most platforms support fractional shares from 1 dollar minimum. BRK.A trades at 670,000 dollars per share, effectively inaccessible to retail. Second, via Indian mutual funds with US exposure. ICICI Prudential US Bluechip Fund holds approximately 2 percent in BRK.B. Franklin US Opportunities holds smaller allocations. Motilal Oswal Nasdaq 100 Fund and Mirae Asset NYSE FANG Plus do not hold BRK.B since it is not in those indices. Third, via international ETFs like SPDR S&P 500 ETF (SPY) and iShares Core S&P 500 ETF (IVV) where Berkshire is roughly 1.6 percent weight. The LRS route gives clean direct exposure. The fund route bundles BRK.B with other holdings and adds 0.9 to 1.5 percent expense ratio. Choose based on portfolio simplicity preference.

Berkshire Hathaway pays no dividends, which simplifies tax treatment significantly. For Indian residents holding BRK.B via LRS, only capital gains tax applies on sale. Capital gains on US stocks held over 24 months qualify as long-term and are taxed at 12.5 percent plus surcharge plus cess under post Budget 2024 rules (raised from 20 percent with indexation). Gains held under 24 months are short-term, taxed at the investor's slab rate. The 24-month threshold for foreign equities is different from 12 months for Indian equities. The DTAA between India and US prevents double taxation only on dividends (where 25 percent US withholding can be claimed as Indian tax credit via Form 67). Since Berkshire does not pay dividends, no foreign tax credit complexity arises. Currency conversion gain on the INR-USD movement between purchase and sale is also part of the LTCG calculation, not separately taxed. LRS remittances above 10 lakh rupees annually attract 20 percent TCS which is refundable against income tax liability.

Berkshire's 325 billion dollar cash pile is the largest in corporate history and represents roughly 30 percent of the company's total assets. Buffett has explicitly framed the build-up as preparation for higher US capital gains taxes that he anticipates over the next decade, and the absence of attractive large-cap deployment opportunities at current valuations. The cash and T-bill portfolio yields roughly 5.1 percent annually, generating 16.5 billion dollars in passive interest income, which exceeds the operating earnings of most companies in the Nifty 50 individually. There are two competing interpretations. Bearish view, Buffett sees no opportunities and is signalling that US large-caps are overvalued. Bullish view, Berkshire is positioned to deploy aggressively into a market correction, providing dry powder that smaller investors lack. The historical pattern, Buffett deployed 50 billion in the 2008 to 2009 crisis when others were forced sellers. The cash pile is now 6x that magnitude, suggesting capacity for a 100 to 150 billion dollar deployment in a meaningful drawdown. This optionality is part of what BRK.B holders pay for.

Berkshire reduced its Apple holding from 905 million shares at peak in 2023 to approximately 300 million shares by Q3 2025, a reduction of roughly two-thirds. Cumulative realised gains were approximately 130 billion dollars, generating a US federal tax liability of roughly 30 billion at the 21 percent corporate rate. Buffett's 2025 annual letter framed the sale primarily as tax planning ahead of anticipated higher US capital gains rates. Analyst consensus suggests three additional factors. First, valuation. Apple traded above 32x forward earnings at peak, well above its historical 18 to 22x range. Second, concentration risk. At peak Apple was over 50 percent of Berkshire's public equity portfolio, against Buffett's own historical preference for top holdings under 25 percent. Third, succession planning. Greg Abel taking over wanted lower single-stock concentration. Importantly, Berkshire still holds approximately 69 billion in Apple, making it the largest position by far. This is rebalancing, not exit. Indian investors who own AAPL directly through LRS or through Nasdaq 100 funds got no Berkshire-related signal on the sale because it was discovered only via 13F filings 45 to 90 days after execution.

Sogo shosha are Japan's general trading houses, conglomerates that span commodities, energy, infrastructure, real estate, and finance. Berkshire's stake in five Japanese trading houses, Mitsubishi Corp, Mitsui, Itochu, Marubeni, and Sumitomo Corp, originally began in 2020 at roughly 6 billion dollars. By 2025 the combined position had grown to approximately 28 billion, including additional purchases. The Japanese yen-denominated bond financing Buffett used for the position (issuing Japan-yen bonds at 0.5 to 1 percent and buying yen-denominated equities) made this effectively a near-zero cost long-duration bet. Returns since 2020 include 3 to 4 percent annual dividends plus 200 to 400 percent capital appreciation. The thesis was simple value investing, sogo shosha traded at single-digit P/Es with 3 to 4 percent dividend yields and book values understating real asset values. Indian investors have effectively no direct access to Japanese trading houses through Indian mutual funds. Holding BRK.B is the most accessible proxy for this thesis from India.

Over the past 10 years (2015 to 2025), BRK.B delivered approximately 13 percent CAGR in USD terms. Adjusted for INR depreciation of roughly 3.5 percent annually against USD, the rupee return is approximately 16.7 percent CAGR. Indian large cap mutual funds delivered between 11 and 14 percent CAGR over the same period, with the best in class HDFC Top 100, ICICI Prudential Bluechip, and Mirae Asset Large Cap clocking 12 to 14 percent. Pure rupee CAGR favours Berkshire by 2 to 4 percentage points, but the comparison is structurally different. Berkshire is concentrated in 10 to 15 US-listed companies plus 325 billion cash plus insurance operations. Indian large cap funds hold 50 to 80 Indian companies across sectors. Berkshire has materially lower volatility (annualised standard deviation roughly 14 percent vs 18 to 20 percent for Indian large cap funds), giving it a higher Sharpe ratio. For an investor seeking US large cap value tilt with low correlation to Nifty 50, BRK.B is a unique exposure that Indian mutual funds cannot replicate. For pure equity beta in INR, Indian large cap funds remain the simpler choice.

Greg Abel took over as CEO on January 1, 2026 while Buffett retains the Chairman role expected until 2027 or longer. Operational decisions including capital allocation are now Abel's. Buffett's role is advisory on major decisions and on the public-facing annual letter. Historical analogs for founder-CEO succession in iconic companies have varied widely. General Electric post-Jack Welch declined 40 percent in 5 years. Microsoft post Bill Gates remained flat for 18 months before Satya Nadella's transformation lifted it 1500 percent over the next decade. Apple post Steve Jobs initially traded sideways but then exceeded all expectations under Tim Cook. The Berkshire bear case assumes Abel lacks Buffett's edge in capital allocation, leading to gradual underperformance versus S&P 500. The bull case is that Berkshire's business mix (insurance float, regulated utilities, freight rail, manufacturing) generates predictable cash flow regardless of CEO and that Abel inherits Buffett's playbook, board, and the 325 billion cash optionality. The market currently prices roughly a 5 to 10 percent succession discount in BRK.B versus historical valuation multiples. The discount is likely to either close in 2 to 3 years (if Abel executes well) or widen significantly (if a major capital allocation error occurs).

Mechanically replicating Berkshire's portfolio from India is possible but inefficient. The top 10 positions are all US-listed and accessible via LRS through INDmoney, Vested, or Groww US, with fractional shares enabling proportional allocation. The challenges, transaction costs become significant on a 10 to 15 stock portfolio (₹40 to ₹100 per trade plus FX conversion 0.5 to 1 percent), the Japanese sogo shosha cannot be bought directly from India through retail platforms, and 13F filings have a 45 to 90 day lag, so by the time you copy, the position may have changed. The practical alternative is simply holding BRK.B which gives proportionally weighted exposure to every Berkshire holding plus the cash, insurance operations, and wholly-owned businesses (GEICO, BNSF, Berkshire Hathaway Energy). This avoids the operational complexity and captures Berkshire's full economic engine, not just the public equity portfolio. For most Indian investors seeking Berkshire exposure, BRK.B is structurally superior to a portfolio replication attempt.

Beyond the BRK.B share price, four cost layers apply. First, FX conversion cost via LRS. Most Indian brokers charge 0.5 to 1 percent on USD conversion. INDmoney 0.5 to 0.75 percent, Vested 0.5 percent plus brokerage, HDFC SkyTrader 1 percent or more. Second, TCS on LRS. For total LRS remittances above 10 lakh rupees in a financial year, 20 percent TCS applies. TCS is refundable against income tax liability but creates working capital drag. Third, US estate tax exposure. US-situs assets above 60,000 dollars held by non-US persons trigger US federal estate tax up to 40 percent on death. BRK.B is US-situs. This is a critical concern for large LRS holdings and rarely discussed in Indian content. Solutions include holding via Irish-domiciled ETFs (no US estate tax exposure) or staying below 60,000 dollar threshold. Fourth, Indian income tax on capital gains at 12.5 percent LTCG (above 24 month holding). All-in friction cost for buying and holding BRK.B for 5 years from India is approximately 1.5 to 3 percent annualised, materially lower than via Indian mutual funds with international FoF structure that charges 1 to 1.5 percent expense ratio plus 12.5 percent LTCG on top of expense drag.